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ABSTRACT 
Today’s military focus has moved away from the 
force-on-force battlefield of the past century and 
into the domain of irregular warfare and its com-
panion security, stability, transition and recon-
struction missions. With that change in focus has 
come a need to examine the operational envi-
ronment from a far wider perspective, one that 
includes the whole range of human experiences 
and circumstances. As the set of factors and list 
of players expands, the need for reliable model-
ing and simulation increases, if for no other rea-
son than to help the human decision maker make 
sense of this expanded decision space. However, 
to do this, the models and simulations must take 
into account the “whole of government,” “whole 
of society,” and all those with an interest in re-
gion in question – allies, trade partners, adversa-
ries, individuals, and networks of influence. The 
ideal solution would be to inject models from the 
human sciences into our kinetic simulations and 
declare success, but this is not possible. The dif-
ferent disciplines that comprise social and human 
sciences have different vocabularies and interpre-
tations of events. They understand measurement, 
data, and models in diverse ways and their time 
scales vary from those we understand from work-
ing with kinetic models. The intent of this paper 
is to examine some of these differences and the 
challenges they present both technically and ma-
nagerially. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Within the military and across other application 
domains, models and simulations are used to 
support a variety of important activities including 
training, decision making at various levels, and 
understanding the interplay of options in a com-
plex environment. The requirement for such 
models is that they reflect – to the extent needed 
for the specific application – the actors and the 
environmental factors that influence their ac-
tions. This requirement is easily stated but not as 
readily implemented as the complexity of the en-
vironment in which the actions take place in-
creases, particularly when that complexity in-
volves the full range of human, social, cultural 
and behavioral factors. 
When irregular warfare missions are in-
volved, avoiding the human element invites fail-
ure. The need to include the human element has 
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been recognized and documented in US military 
warfighting concepts: 
Irregular warfare depends not just on our military 
prowess, but also our understanding of such so-
cial dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, 
religious influences and cultural mores. People, 
not platforms and advanced technology, will be 
the key to irregular warfare success. The joint 
force will need to be patient, persistent, and cultu-
rally savvy people to build the local relationships 
and partnerships essential to executing irregular 
warfare. [IWJOC, 2007]  
This concept of irregular warfare as an en-
gagement, building relationships and partner-
ships, is consistent with the understanding that 
the military mission is a part of an overall na-
tional security policy that involves all pillars of 
national power – diplomacy, information, mili-
tary and economic (DIME). 
The NATO Code of Best Practice for Com-
mand and Control (C2) assessment, written in 
support of analyzing operations other than war, 
observed that military forces are used increasing-
ly as an integrated part of overarching political 
operations [NATO, 2002]. If this is the case, and 
the need involves modeling the outcome of the 
overall operation, what were formerly purely 
military simulations must now incorporate 
“whole of government” and “whole of society” 
roles, factors, and environments. Thus the re-
quirement to model actors and the environmental 
factors that influence their behavior becomes 
significantly more difficult. 
Military simulations to date have relied on 
the familiar areas of attrition, maneuver, weapo-
nry, and battle damage in environments that, 
while complex, were largely governed by physi-
cal laws readily cast into mathematical relation-
ships. Interactions among systems were difficult, 
but the relationships governing them were rea-
sonably well known and computable. The data to 
support the models had been collected over many 
years using field and laboratory experiments. 
While the “end-to-end” system of interactions in 
a complicated joint land, air, and sea battle still 
required some level of assessment by subject 
matter experts, these experts could rely on hav-
ing experienced the same type of scenario in the 
course of their military careers.  
The universe changes when the human do-
main becomes a driving factor in the simulation. 
Social sciences have also used various types of 
models, but the nature and basis of the models 
are different across the various social science 
disciplines and from the physical models of tradi-
tional military simulation. The data to support 
social science models comes from different 
sources, and its collection is often complicated in 
ways unknown to physical scientists. Laboratory 
experiments are made difficult by timelines, of-
ten generational, and the problem of holding va-
riables constant. It may take years for a social 
change to take place; during that time the world 
may change in ways that cannot be controlled by 
an experiment. Social science experiments give 
physical scientists headaches. All these chal-
lenges must be understood, met, and addressed 
before the human sciences can become full part-
ners in military simulation. Just enumerating the 
relevant human factors and the disciplines that 
study them strikes fear into the heart of the simu-
lation community – or should. Fig. 1 (next page) 
illustrates the factors that form and govern the 
human actor. 
The technical complexity spawns managerial 
difficulties. Advancing our ability to model the 
full range of military problems, including the mi-
litarily relevant aspects of human behavior, re-
quires approaches that bridge managerial as well 
as technical problems. 
The first problem is a lack of common voca-
bulary among the physical scientists, social 
scientists, and user communities. This observa-
tion has been made by NATO and in the United 
States by Joint Forces Command and by partici-
pants when conferences and workshops have 
brought these communities into direct contact. 
The presence of so many different academic dis-
ciplines in Fig. 1 is testimony to the fact that cul-
tural (and lexical) divisions separate the groups 
engaged in the study of the human domain. 
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The next problem is that the management 
structure in military simulation, including the 
groups that fund the development of new models, 
is dominated by physical scientists – those very 
people who get headaches whenever they are 
confronted with the issues and methods of the 
human sciences. When their comfort zone is the 
physical sciences, it is difficult for resource 
sponsors to place their trust in the results of so-
cial science research, experimentation, and mod-
eling. This is compounded by the fact that social 
science models do not yield to traditional ap-
proaches for validation, verification, and accredi-
tation. Fig. 2 shows some modeling approaches 
arranged along a scale with engineering models 
on the left and heuristics-based modeling on the 
right. The comfort zone of the defense modeling 
establishment is solidly on the left while the 
models most useful in many social and human 
contexts fall to the right. The MINERVA pro-
gram was initiated to open dialog between the 
military and the social science community with-
out requiring that the research be sponsored un-
der the defense establishment. It is one of a num-
ber of efforts on the part of the military research 
community to engage social scientists and take 
advantage of their expertise in solving the new 
and difficult problems that face the defense 
community. 
Finally, nobody wants to be responsible for 
data. Everyone needs data, but the prospect of 
having to be the collection, storage, and dissemi-






























Figure 1. Factors involved in human decision making and their formal academic disciplines 
























Figure 2. Modeling domain (engineering models on the left, social science models on the right). 
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nation agent for the data are daunting, particular-
ly since there are no universally accepted tax-
onomies or metadata standards upon which to re-
ly when working across social science 
disciplines. 
2 A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR SOCIAL 
SCIENCE MODELING  
In response to the changes in military missions 
and their implication for research in modeling, 
the US Air Force requested the National Re-
search Council (NRC) to review the state of the 
art in modeling the behavior of humans as indi-
viduals and in groups of various sizes (the larger 
social context). The application areas included 
the development of doctrine, strategies, and tac-
tics for dealing with both state and non-state ad-
versaries; the analysis of current political and 
military situations for planning and future opera-
tions; and the development of models and simu-
lations for training and mission rehearsal. Once 
gaps had been identified, the NRC study panel 
was asked to develop a research roadmap for fill-
ing those gaps. 
The study [Zacharias, 2008] organized its 
conclusions in five major categories: 
1.  Modeling strategy—matching the problem to the 
real world: Difficulties in this area are created ei-
ther by inattention to the real world being mod-
eled or by unrealistic expectations about how 
much of the world can be modeled and how close 
a match between model and world is feasible.  
2.  Verification, validation, and accreditation: These 
important functions often are made more difficult 
by expectations that verification, validation, and 
accreditation (VV&A)—as it has been defined for 
the validation of models of physical systems—can 
be usefully applied to IOS (individual, organiza-
tional, societal) models.  
3.  Modeling tactics—designing the internal structure 
of a model: Problems are sometimes generated by 
unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the 
social, organizational, cultural, and individual 
behavior domains, and sometimes by a failure to 
deliberately and thoughtfully match the scope of 
the model to the scope of the phenomena to be 
modeled.  
4.  Differences between modeling physical phenome-
na and human behavior—dealing with uncertainty 
and adaptation: Problems arise from unrealistic 
expectations of how much uncertainty reduction is 
plausible in modeling human and organizational 
behavior, as well as on poor choices in handling 
the changing nature of human structures and 
processes.  
5.  Combining components and federating models: 
Problems arise from the way in which linkages 
within and across levels of analysis change the 
nature of system operation. They occur when 
creating multilevel models and when linking to-
gether more specialized models of behavior into a 
federation of models.  
The study regarded the modeling of human be-
havior as an emerging science and acknowledged 
the many disciplines from which it had drawn. It 
also acknowledged that to provide a robust scien-
tific foundation for such modeling, researchers 
from different domains needed a common 
framework for expressing concepts and forums 
in which to compare, discuss, and evaluate their 
findings and results. 
The study’s recommendations included the fol-
lowing: 
1. Sponsor an integrated, cross-disciplinary 
research program that would include the 
development of theory; the ability to 
model uncertainty, dynamic adaptability, 
and rational (or irrational) behavior; me-
thodologies for the collection of data, par-
ticularly in denied or dangerous areas; the 
ability to federate models and understand-
ing of when such federation is appropri-
ate; ways of validating and assessing the 
utility of models; and development of 
tools and infrastructure for enabling mod-
el building. 
2. Incentivize multidisciplinary conferences 
and workshops to assist social science 
model developers in understanding the 
nature of military decision making, and to 
help military sponsors and users to realize 
the nature and applicability of social 
science models.  
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3. Develop a roadmap for future research 
and development based on a dialog be-
tween the scientist and the user, and fo-
cused on a series of challenge problems 
with clear specifications for the uses of 
the model together with well-defined mil-
itary needs. 
The recognition of the need to couple the re-
search to demanding user needs as a way of en-
gaging the military community is a critical in-
sight, one that is also important in scaling the 
problem down to tractable size. 
3 CRITICALITY OF HAVING USER 
NEEDS SPECIFIED 
Unless there is a significant effort made to en-
gage the military user in determining what 
should be modeled, the modeling community 
will be condemned to try to model everything – 
an impossibility. Not all facets of human exis-
tence are militarily relevant; however, only a 
concerted effort at defining mission-oriented 
needs can provide the appropriate framework for 
modelers. While some missions require highly 
detailed data a the local level, for example, data 
about needs and interests of a village, not all ap-
plications need this type and resolution of data. 
Thus it is important both to modeling and data 
collection to understand the questions that have 
to be addressed for different military missions. 
A few simple illustrative examples show the 
different types of models and data sets that ser-
vice specific missions. Consider the problem of a 
regional combatant commander who is responsi-
ble for the security of the area of the world that is 
his domain. One of the most critical factors for 
him is to anticipate when a fragile state is likely 
to erupt into violence. Generally stability as-
sessments rely on large sets of statistical data and 
a few clusters of factors that appear to be leading 
indicators of problems. There is no need to have 
a detailed understanding of tribal customs, for 
example, to evaluate the likelihood of violence 
breaking out. An ongoing research program 
sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency [DARPA, 2009] is developing a 
set of linked tools for addressing this type of ap-
plication. 
If you are a military commander engaged in a 
reconstruction operation, you may need to assess 
the success of your projects in achieving the 
overall goal of returning the governance and wel-
fare of the country to its own government. In this 
case, the model must describe the principal fac-
tors that determine stability in a country, factors 
that contribute to or detract from stability. Such a 
model has already been developed collaborative-
ly by the Department of Defense, State Depart-
ment, and US Agency for International Devel-
opment; it is based on assessing the following 
factors: political moderation, a safe and secure 
environment, the rule of law, a sustainable econ-
omy, and social well-being [Dziedzic, 2008]. 
There are both objective and subjective compo-
nents of each of these factors; therefore, the data 
collected to evaluate performance have to in-
clude both concrete evidence of performance and 
perception of performance.  
While stability is an issue for both the re-
gional combatant commander and for the mili-
tary commander in charge of reconstruction, the 
models and data vary with the specific mission 
and the questions arising from that mission. A 
completely different approach is needed for the 
commander who must work in a region where 
hostilities are active and security is at issue. The 
forward based commander, like the commander 
in Khost or Helmand in Afghanistan, needs to 
understand the population at a much more re-
fined level. A taxonomy for state and non-state 
actors including their interests, capabilities, oper-
ational context and decision-making styles, could 
direct the military user toward the information he 
must collect to begin to understand the dynamics 
of his environment [Numrich, 2008]. Using such 
data, agent-based models might then be used to 
explore possible futures or the potential success 
of courses of action [Chaturvedi, 2005; Silver-
man, 2006 a, b]. 
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Consider a different problem – tracking glob-
al terrorist movements and determining which of 
the many groups might be contemplating the use 
of weapons of mass destruction. As a global 
problem with security implications, this becomes 
a military mission. With limited resources, the 
hundreds of terrorist groups cannot all be watch-
ed with the same intensity. To make this problem 
tractable, the military user must determine a sub-
set of groups that is more likely than the others to 
be able to acquire and use such weapons. Taking 
the Bayesian view that past performance is an 
indicator of future action, modelers have used 
regression analyses to compare key parameters 
of terrorist groups and identify correlations and 
similarities, thereby reducing a list of hundreds 
to the top twenty or thirty [Asal, 2008]. The data 
useful in this analysis are incident data extracted 
from unformatted textual accounts of incidences 
of violence. 
Breaking out the complexity of human, so-
cial, cultural, and behavioral modeling through a 
careful examination of mission needs is a prac-
tical way of understanding the data and modeling 
requirements. While it is certainly possible to in-
corporate social science modeling into military 
applications without first understanding the mis-
sion needs, the NATO Code of Best Practices 
[NATO, 2002] would argue against such an ap-
proach. The Code places emphasis on problem 
formulation as fundamental to any analysis, es-
pecially when the problems are ill-defined and 
complex, and involve many dimensions with a 
rich context. There is much wisdom in specifying 
a problem with care before attempting a solution, 
but time and resource constraints get in the way 
of wisdom. 
4 A WORD ABOUT DATA AND MODELS 
The examples above allude to an interplay be-
tween data and models that is significantly dif-
ferent from what has been observed in physics-
based modeling. Some modeling approaches 
make extensive use of statistical data, a form of 
data that we consider to be objective or “hard” 
data. In other cases, the issue and hence the mod-
el requires soft or subjective (perceptual) data. 
Often the combination of both types of data are 
required. 
For example, if the issue is whether a popula-
tion is likely to react negatively to a situation, the 
critical factor may be the difference between the 
actual situation and the people’s perception of it. 
The statistical values alone do not tell the story. 
Suppose the issue is the availability of reliable 
electrical power, and the statistical data indicates 
that reliable power is available four hours a day, 
seven days a week. In West Africa, having four 
hours of reliable power every day may be close 
to a miracle, but in Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
this degree of deprivation could well cause riots 
in the streets. In many human circumstances, the 
issue is not the reality but the difference between 
the expectation and the reality – an interplay be-
tween the objective and subjective data. 
But where do the data come from, how easy is it 
to get, and how reliable is it? One might hope 
that statistical data are readily available and reli-
able; however, that is not always the case, and 
particularly for developing nations that are 
among the most likely to be fragile and on the 
verge of state failure. Statistical variables are not 
always interpreted uniformly, nor are they com-
puted in a standard way. The United Nations is 
currently engaged in a multi-year program to 
standardize the interpretation and computation of 
statistical data across its member nations. How-
ever, even in cases where the interpretation and 
computation are not in question, frequently there 
are gaps in the availability or currency of the da-
ta. Data at the provincial and district levels are 
absent entirely for the majority of developing na-
tions. In countries without a solid resource base 
or where security issues impede collection of da-
ta, statistical tables may be a decade or more out 
of date. For some countries, even the most basic 
demographic data may be lacking. For example, 
in Sudan, the last census was taken more than ten 
years ago, and the interim migrations, caused by 
war and drought, have changed the population 
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densities in both the eastern and western fron-
tiers. 
Statistical tables are not the only hard data that 
are important in social science modeling. The 
characterization of terrorist groups done by Asal 
and Rethemeyer [Asal, 2008] relies on event da-
ta. No agency or entity is currently tasked with 
recording all incidents of violence. Extensive 
work has been done to extract that information 
from numerous sources, most often press releas-
es. Such sources do not come coded in database 
format but rather exist in plain text with a some-
what-haphazard handling of details such as time, 
location, and lethality. To create a reliable event 
database, a dedicated research group must first 
create a code book – a list of all the desired va-
riables and a description of how the variable is to 
be interpreted. The code book and the media ar-
ticles are then given to research assistants who 
extract the variables from the information in the 
articles. Their work is carefully checked by a ve-
rifier and then entered into the database. Most 
individual sources will not contain the full set of 
variables sought, resulting in gaps in the data. In 
addition, sources must be compared carefully to 
make sure that multiple reports of the same inci-
dent are handled properly. This is a manual 
process; attempts to automate it have been met 
with only limited success. 
The common sources for perceptual or subjective 
data are structured polls, discussions with subject 
matter experts, or extraction of information from 
media sources (press releases, information pub-
lished on web sites, audio and video clips). Ac-
curate polling data are hard to acquire, particular-
ly when crossing cultural and linguistic barriers 
that tend to blur meaning. Eliciting the desired 
information frequently requires breaking the di-
rect questions suitable for American audiences 
into clusters of related but culturally appropriate 
concepts. Professional polling groups earn their 
reputations by producing statistically consistent, 
culturally adjusted polls that are repeated at least 
annually to permit the construction of trend lines. 
When professional polls are not available, casual 
surveys can provide useful information; howev-
er, the results can be suspect on technical 
grounds including selection of the sampled popu-
lation, nature of the questions and the manner in 
which the survey is administered. 
Subject matter experts are important sources of 
information and their perspectives on a situation 
can add critical insight. However, the same expe-
riences and training that contribute to their exper-
tise can also create a bias in their perceptions. 
Since choosing the “right” subject matter expert 
is extremely difficult, the safest approach to us-
ing subject matter experts is to use a wide 
enough variety to minimize the impact of relying 
on any single point of view or bias. 
Media extraction presents a very different set of 
issues. All media articles are biased in some way. 
The editorial policy of the newspaper or the 
perspective of the reporter may be the source of 
bias. In nations where the press is both monitored 
and controlled, the media will publish what the 
government wants. Translations can be biased 
based on the skill of the translator. Automation 
has been used to speed the extraction of data 
from texts. Some types of extraction rely on 
word matching and statistical analyses, and are 
referred to as “bag of words” approaches. Other 
methods use natural language processing to ex-
tract a more nuanced meaning; however, these 
methods are hard to apply beyond the English 
language. This is particularly unfortunate since 
the most reliable reporting is done in the verna-
cular. 
Data acquisition for social science models is not 
easy, and there are normally gaps in the available 
data. A careful analysis based on mission needs 
can help focus data acquisition on militarily rele-
vant information and avoid expending scarce re-
sources on creating overly large taxonomies, data 
bases and metadata standards.  
5 COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST (COI) 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) recognized the 
need for locating and linking a network of ex-
perts who could explore effective methods for 
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applying social science models to irregular war-
fare problems [Garrett, 2009]. This effort capita-
lized on the prior work done under NATO in 
building a framework for collaboration. To iden-
tify initial group membership, the research group 
supporting COI created a questionnaire to identi-
fy and catalog the knowledge of experts. Initial-
ly, the structure of the NATO Code of Best Prac-
tice for C2 Assessment guided the categorization. 
Experts in human and social sciences have im-
proved this structure to reflect a better characte-
rization of their disciplines. The catalog was im-
plemented using a global visualization tool, “The 
Brain,” instead of traditional databases. The 
Brain supported not only the immediate visuali-
zation of the COI, it also showed where gaps ex-
isted, and where overlapping functionality re-
sided. Experts and military practitioners were 
encouraged to enter a collaborative environment 
through which they could share ideas and work 
with the Brain. Every effort was made to create a 
welcoming virtual environment for all research-
ers, not only those who would normally work 
with the military. 
A number of problems are associated with 
the formation of communities of interest, at least 
two of which are critical and involve resourcing. 
The first problem involves creating an incentive 
for individuals to participate regularly; the 
second, providing sustainment of the COI over 
time. While nearly all groups and individuals in-
volved with the application of human sciences to 
military modeling agree that cross-disciplinary 
engagement of experts and users is essential to 
breaking down the language barriers and creating 
an environment of mutual understanding, nobody 
has yet solved the problem of incentivizing busy 
people to spend part of their limited time en-
gaged in a COI. While JFCOM was able to 
create a novel and effective environment for the 
COI, their effort was in the nature of an experi-
ment; to date, no entity has been willing or able 
to resource the sustainment of the COI. 
While these issues are not peculiar to social 
science modeling, the inability to solve them has 
a greater negative impact on a field that is strug-
gling to establish itself.  
6 FINDING A WAY FORWARD 
For those who feared that the modeling and si-
mulation (M&S) community had solved the hard 
problems and was destined to a future of limited 
improvements, the need to incorporate the human 
dimension – the “whole of government” and 
“whole of society” factors into military simula-
tion – has created myriad challenges. The de-
mands for social science modeling, or the results 
thereof, have now been heard and resources are 
being brought to bear on addressing the attendant 
problems. The lessons learned in working with 
kinetic models and simulations must be carried 
forward, but new challenges requiring new ap-
proaches have arrived with the introduction of 
new disciplines. From model design to valida-
tion, technical and managerial processes must be 
rethought to accommodate the theories and me-
thods of the social sciences. Data acquisition 
takes on new dimensions with the need to blend 
objective and subjective data. Both incentivizing 
and sustainment will present problems as the 
field of social science modeling attempts to find 
its footing in military applications. With chal-
lenges come opportunities. While the field is in 
its early stages, the M&S community would be 
wise to engage across the user and expert com-
munities to define clear mission-driven needs as 
suggested by the National Research Council. 
Time and resources expended to specify the 
problems clearly and create meaningful conver-
sations between the military users and experts in 
social science modeling will save time and re-
sources as we strive to meet the challenges of 
human, social, cultural, and behavior modeling 
for military missions. 
REFERENCES 
Asal, V., Rethemeyer, R.K. (2008). “The Nature 
of the Beast: Organizational Structures and 
Organizational Lethality.” Journal of Poli-
tics, 70(2), 437–449. 
SCS M&S Magazine – 2010-01 (January)                                                                              Numrich &Tolk - Page 9 of 9 
 
Chaturvedi, A., Mehta, S., Dolk, D., Ayer, R. 
(2005). “Agent-based simulation for compu-
tational experimentation: Developing an ar-
tificial labor market,” European Journal of 
Operational Research Vol. 166, 694–716 
DARPA (2009). See the ICEWS program de-
scription on DARPA website, 
http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/icews 
Dziedzic, M., Sotirin, B., Agoglia, J. (2008). 
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environ-
ments (MPICE) – A Metrics Framework for 
Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabi-
lization. Version 1.0. Corps of Engineers, 
Report A942884, Washington, DC. 
Earnest, D.C., Gaubatz, K.T. (2007). “Modeling, 
Simulation, and the Social Sciences: An 
Agenda for Integration.” Proc. Spring Simu-
lation Interoperability Workshop, Norfolk, 
VA: March 25–30 
Garrett, R.B., Tolk, A., Bacon, T.J. (2009). “Ex-
ploring Effective Methods for Modeling a 
Comprehensive Approach to Political, Mili-
tary, Economic, Social, Information, and In-
frastructure (PMESII) / Human, Cultural, So-
cial, and Behavioral (HSCB) Community of 
Interest (COI).” Proc. Winter Simulation 
Conference, Austin, TX: Dec 13–16 (in 
press). 
IWJOC. Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Con-
cept. 11 September 2007. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf. 
NATO. (2002). NATO Code of Best Practice for 
Command and Control Assessment. Revised 
2002, Reprinted by CCRP Press. Washing-
ton, DC. 
Numrich, S K “Culture, Models, and Games: In-
corporating Warfare’s Human Dimension.” 
IEEE Intelligent Systems July/August 2008, 
58–61. 
Silverman, B.G., Johns, M., Cornwell, J., 
O'Brien, K. (2006a). “Human behavior mod-
els for agents in simulators and games: Part I: 
enabling science with PMFserv.” Presence: 
Teleoper. Virtual Environ. Vol. 15, No. 2: 
139–162 
Silverman, B.G., Bharathy, G., O'Brien, K., 
Cornwell, J. (2006b). “Human behavior 
models for agents in simulators and games: 
Part II: gamebot engineering with PMFserv.” 
Presence: Teleoper. Virtual Environ. Vol. 15, 
No. 2: 163–185. 
Tolk, A. “Emerging M&S Challenges for Hu-
man, Social, Cultural and Behavioral Model-
ing Proc. Summer Computer Simulation Con-
ference 2009. 
Zacharias, G.L., MacMillan, J., Van Hemel, S.B., 
editors. “Behavioral Modeling and Simula-
tion: From Individuals to Societies.” National 






ANDREAS TOLK is Associate Professor for 
Engineering Management and Systems Engineer-
ing at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Vir-
ginia. He holds a MS in Computer Science 
(1988) and a PhD in Computer Science and Ap-
plied Operations Research (1995). His e-mail ad-
dress is atolk@odu.edu.  
S K NUMRICH is on the research staff at the 
Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, 
Virginia. She holds a PhD in physics, has worked 
extensively in the M&S world, and has an abid-
ing interest in the modeling of human and physi-
cal environments. 
